SEC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR
PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES SHOULD NOT
BE EXPANDED DESPITE ADVANCEMENTS IN
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ABSTRACT
Advancements in information technology allow information to
be collected and analyzed quickly within a corporation. As a result,
technology also allows the quicker release of information to the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)—much quicker than the
Form 10-K and Form 10-Q releases that are currently required for
publicly traded companies. Although publicly traded companies
must also disclose certain significant events in Form 8-K, the
reporting requirements for publicly traded companies are not
nearly as expansive as they could be considering the easy access
these companies have to their business information. Even with this
in mind, the SEC is well into a reevaluation of Regulation S-K
primarily because requirements have accreted over time to become
not just burdensome to companies but also blinding to investors
who are overwhelmed by the volume of disclosure thrown at them.
This paper expounds on these arguments and posits additional
arguments for why the SEC should not expand reporting
requirements for publicly traded companies. Specifically, expanded
requirements are associated with high compliance costs; market
forces already induce higher-quality disclosures; the more
information companies file with the SEC, the more advantages they
give to their competitors; and both the liability concerns and the
doctrinal issues already associated with the current requirements
will be exacerbated with an expansion of the requirements.

INTRODUCTION
Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 created a mandatory disclosure system in the United States. Since the
passage of these laws, the reporting requirements for publicly traded
companies have continued to expand, especially in regards to Form 8-K.
Advancements in information technology have allowed for the creation of
†

Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2017; University of Chicago,
B.A. Political Science and Public Policy, 2014. I would like to thank Professor
James D. Cox for his mentorship.

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

197

the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System (EDGAR),
Interactive Data Electronic Applications (IDEA), and extensible Business
Reporting Language (XBRL)—all of which have made it easier for
investors to gain access to information on publicly traded companies. Even
though these technological advances have furthered one of the main goals
of the securities laws—to increase investors’ access to information about
publicly traded companies—further technological advances should not lead
to more expansive reporting requirements.
This paper sets forth five arguments against the expansion of
reporting requirements that outweigh the benefit of increasing the amount of
information available to investors: expanded requirements are associated
with high compliance costs; market forces—primarily an issuer’s concern
for both its reputation and the scrutiny placed on it by investment analysts
and the financial press—already cause higher-quality disclosures; the more
proprietary information a company shares with its competitors, the more its
competitive advantage decreases; and both the liability concerns and the
doctrinal issues already associated with the current reporting requirements
will only be exacerbated with an increase in requirements. More
specifically, this article will address the following doctrinal issues: the
ambiguity of ripeness and, relatedly, how best to articulate a duty to update,
a duty to correct, and managers’ duties under the Management Discussion
and Analysis (MD&A) requirement.

I. THE CREATION OF THE SEC DISCLOSURE SYSTEM
The Great Depression and the Stock Market Crash of 1929 provided
the political momentum for congressional enactment of a mandatory
disclosure system through the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.1 Congress hoped these new laws would eliminate
fraud from the market and provide assurance to investors that they would
receive the returns they expected, which would keep investors from
withdrawing their capital and the economy from stagnating.2
The Securities Act “regulates the public offering and sale of
securities in interstate commerce.”3 At the time of its passage, it required
disclosure to the Federal Trade Commission, in the form of a registration
statement, when a corporation made a public offering.4 Since the passage of
1

See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 5
(7th ed. 2013).
2
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 670 (1984).
3
COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
4
See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 355 (unabr. 11th ed. 2014).
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the Securities Exchange Act, corporations are required to file registration
statements with the SEC. The registration statement “seeks to assure full
and fair disclosure in connection with the public distribution of securities.”5
Most of the substantive information required in a registration statement
must also be included in the prospectus, which must be given to investors so
they can “fully assess the merits of their purchase of the security.”6
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted with three goals
in mind: “to control the trading practices of brokers, dealers, investors, and
the exchanges themselves to prevent manipulation and undue speculation”;
to regulate “the behavior of issuers and managers whose stock was traded
on the exchanges”; and to require “mandatory disclosure requirements for
certain publicly traded issuers.”7 To implement the regulations authorized
by the act, as well as to enforce compliance, the Securities Exchange Act
created the SEC, which is now the sole administrative body in charge of
enforcing securities laws. A central component of the Securities Exchange
Act is the imposition of periodic-reporting requirements on corporations
that: have a security listed on a national exchange (section 12(a)); have a
class of equity securities held of record by 2000 persons or more or at least
500 holders who are non-accredited investors and have total assets
exceeding $10 million (section 12(g)); or have registered securities pursuant
to a public offering of their securities (section 15(d)).8 Under section 13 of
the Securities Exchange Act, these corporations must file Form 10-K
annually, Form 10-Q quarterly, and Form 8-K after the occurrence of
certain significant events.9

II. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES
Filings with the SEC are submitted electronically through
EDGAR,10 which was introduced by Congressional mandate in 1983.11 At
first, registrants submitted their Securities Act registration statements and
Exchange Act periodic reports through EDGAR by the physical delivery of
diskettes or magnetic tapes or direct transmission over telephone lines using
modems.12 Now, all registrants must file mandated information
5

COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
Id. at 6.
7
Id. at 580.
8
See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 4, at 354.
9
See id.
10
See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 140.
11
See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), at 6 n.31 (Dec.
1, 2013), 2013 WL 7117005.
12
See id.
6
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electronically, which most often occurs by e-mail transmission.13 Filed
information is usually available within thirty minutes of it being filed with
the SEC.14 Regulation S-T sets forth the “manner and protocol for making
electronic filings,” which have the same content as paper-based filings, but
require different formatting.15 Confidential passwords assigned to each
registrant ensure that filed information is protected against tampering.16 In
order to better facilitate “investor decision making, since 2009 the SEC has
required filings to be pursuant to its [IDEA], which itself builds on a
software program, XBRL . . . , by which information is ‘tagged’ by
reporting companies so that users can thereafter sort information according
to the pretagged code.”17 The XBRL system allows investors to quickly
compare reporting items across companies.18 These advancements in
information and communications technologies have become “critical to
healthy and efficient primary and secondary markets” because they help
further the primary goals of the federal securities laws: protecting investors
and promoting fair and orderly markets.19
The Exchange Act requires periodic disclosures for certain publicly
traded issuers. These disclosures were meant to make information available
to investors trading in securities that is similar in quantity and quality to the
information made available for public offerings of securities under the
Securities Act.20
A reporting company must file Form 10-K at the end of each fiscal
year. Pursuant to Regulation S-K, Form 10-K must include audited financial
statements; a management report; and disclosures concerning legal
proceedings, conflict-of-interest transactions, and other specified issues.21
A reporting company must also file Form 10-Q at the end of each
fiscal quarter. Pursuant to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X, Form 10-Q
must include quarterly financial data, a management report, disclosures
concerning defaults on senior securities, and other specified issues.22

13

See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 140.
See id.
15
Id.
16
See id.
17
Id. at 10.
18
See id.
19
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report to the Congress: The Impact of Recent
Technological Advances on the Securities Markets (Nov. 26, 1997),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/techrp97.htm.
20
See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 580.
21
EISENBERG & COX, supra note 4, at 354.
22
Id.
14
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Reporting companies must file Form 8-K on the occurrence of
certain significant events. The evolution of this form demonstrates how the
evolution of technology has impacted the SEC disclosure system.
Originally, Form 8-K had to be filed “within ten days of the end of any
month during which certain significant events occurred.”23 These significant
events included certain events in a company’s operation, such as a change
of control, the acquisition or disposition of a significant amount of assets,
and amendments to the articles or bylaws.24 In the late 1980s, the deadline
for filing Form 8-K was shortened to somewhere between five to fifteen
days (depending on the significant event) after the occurrence of the event.25
In 2004, when computer technology could finally support its enactment and
the financial and accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002 required it,26 the
SEC issued a rule increasing the number of reportable events to twentytwo.27 The 2004 rule also shortened the disclosure deadline for filing Form
8-K to two to four business days after the occurrence of the event.28
In addition to Form 8-K, the SEC also requires companies to
disclose public offerings of securities by the filing of a registration
statement.29
In the early 1980s, the SEC adopted an integrated disclosure
system, which allows certain companies registering securities under the
Securities Act to “fulfill many of the [Securities] Act’s disclosure demands
by incorporating into the Securities Act registration statement information
from their Exchange Act filings.”30 The integrated disclosure system saves
corporations a substantial amount of both time and money during
registration.

III. ADVANCEMENTS IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SHOULD NOT
CAUSE THE FURTHER EXPANSION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
FOR PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES
During the last two decades there have been dramatic
improvements in information technology. The SEC’s embrace of XBRL and
the evolution of Form 8-K reflect these changes. While the reason for
23

Alina Lerman & Joshua Livnat, The New Form 8-K Disclosures 3 (Dec. 19,
2008) (unpublished paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1126816.
24
See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 10, 581; EISENBERG & COX, supra note 4, at
354.
25
See Lerman & Livnat, supra note 23, at 1.
26
See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 581.
27
See Lerman & Livnat, supra note 23, at 4.
28
See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 4, at 354.
29
See id. at 876–78.
30
COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
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requiring reporting in ninety-day increments was understandable in a paperbased reporting system, that justification is no longer reasonable given the
improved ease and speed with which large amounts of data can be collected,
analyzed, and presented. But technological capability should not be the sole
consideration. In fact, reporting requirements should not be expanded any
further due to high compliance costs, impactful market forces, unnecessary
loss of competitive advantage, and the exacerbation of liability concerns
and doctrinal issues.

A. Compliance Costs
The expansion of reporting requirements will increase compliance
costs for reporting companies. Form 8-K provides an excellent example of
this. In 2004, the number of events triggering a Form 8-K disclosure
increased significantly.31 At the time, the SEC calculated that the 2004
amendments would increase the number of reports on Form 8-K per
company per year by five, on average.32 They also calculated that each
company would spend five hours filling out each form, 75% of the time
spent by the company and 25% of the time spent by outside counsel, which
charged, on average, $300 per hour.33 Based on the fact that approximately
11,800 companies filed Form 8-K reports in 2003, the SEC predicted that
the total costs of hiring outside professionals for all companies combined
would increase by $22,125,000.34
EDGAR, which enables companies to file reports directly with the
SEC “over the Internet, without the added costs of using third parties to
submit filings,” has admittedly enabled lower filing costs.35 Still, EDGAR
and other technological advances have not decreased filing costs enough to
even come close to eliminating the high compliance costs associated with
additional reporting requirements.
The SEC’s current reporting requirements may already produce too
much information.36 The fact that “not all, or even most, investors need to
be well informed for the market to be efficient” supports this assertion.37

31

See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing
Date, Securities Act Release No. 8400, Exchange Act Release No. 49424, 2004
WL 536851, at *32 (Mar. 16, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 8400].
32
See id at 31.
33
See id.
34
See id.
35
Id. at 33.
36
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 730 (1984).
37
Id. at 730–31.
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Furthermore, a rather small portion of reporting companies—only 10% in
1977—are regularly followed by securities analysts.38
The expansion of the scale and scope of securities regulation has
also created fears that the reporting requirements have become overly
burdensome for smaller firms.39 As of 2011, the average initial compliance
cost associated with conducting an initial public offering was $2.5 million,
followed by an ongoing compliance cost for issuers, once public, of $1.5
million per year.40 The JOBS Act and the Dodd-Frank Act have helped this
problem by providing some special accommodations for smaller firms, but
the costs are still onerous.41 This is cause for concern because strict
regulation quite possibly has caused, and will continue to cause, atrophy of
the public markets—currently, “IPOs are down severely, particularly among
smaller firms, and” deregistering—which a corporation can do if it
decreases its record holders to less than 300—is common.42 There were
52% fewer listed companies in 2013 than in 1998 and the number of listings
on the New York Stock Exchange in 2011 was the lowest in over thirty-five
years.43
Expanded reporting requirements also mean higher compliance
costs for the SEC. The SEC spends approximately $1 billion a year
enforcing securities laws44—this figure will have to increase if the SEC is
forced to spend more time on ensuring and enforcing compliance.

B. Market Forces
Some may argue that, with the exception of over burdensome
requirements, increased reporting requirements will increase the amount of
information available to investors, which can only be a good thing for both
investors and the market. However, this argument fails to consider the
influence of market forces. There “are a variety of market forces that
presumptively lead to high-quality issuer disclosure.”45 The reputational
benefit to an issuer of accurate and increased disclosures and the policing

38

See id. at 724.
See Jeff Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled Equity Market
Regulation, 39 J. CORP. L. 347, 348 (2014).
40
See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,482 (Nov. 16, 2015).
41
See Schwartz, supra note 39, at 349.
42
Id. at 354.
43
See id.
44
James D. Cox, Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University School of
Law, Securities Regulation Class (Feb. 17, 2016).
45
Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering Liability
in a Continuous Disclosure Environment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
2000, at 45, 52.
39
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effect of investment analysts and the financial press are two such market
forces.
1. Issuer’s Reputation
An issuer’s concern for its reputation in the market can incentivize
the issuer to disclose both accurate information and more information than
is required of them under the securities laws. Those issuers who highly
value the opinions of investors will be incentivized to make accurate
disclosures because “[a] company that misleads investors risks a lower
stock price if the fraud is discovered.”46 Furthermore, one way issuers can
separate themselves in the market is by disclosing information
demonstrating the high quality of their securities.47 Investors also tend to
value firms with more publicly disclosed information, so some issuers may
even choose to disclose more than required by law. This is particularly
important in the current age of technology, where investors can easily find
out what information an issuer has disclosed, because once a firm starts
disclosing certain additional information, it cannot stop—investors will tend
to assume the worst if it does.48
2. Investment Analysts and Financial Press
Investment analysts and the financial press also incentivize
companies to release accurate information. Large public companies are
intensely scrutinized by both investment analysts and the financial press,
which “makes fraud much more difficult to execute successfully.”49 This is
especially true in the Internet age, where investors have immediate and
relatively costless access to disclosed information, which pressures
companies to be even more thorough and timely.50
Regulation FD was adopted in August 2000 “as a response to
securities issuers’ widespread practice of disclosing certain material
information directly to industry analysts or institutional investors.”51
Regulation FD tried to curb this behavior by requiring issuers who
intentionally disclose material nonpublic information to disclose that
information to the public simultaneously.52 Regulation FD permits
companies to publicly disclose material information through social media

46

Id.
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 674.
48
See id. at 683.
49
Langevoort, supra note 45, at 52.
50
See Coffee, supra note 36, at 723.
51
Sesi Garimella, Regulation FD and Social Media, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
234, 235 (2013).
52
See id. at 236.
47
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websites.53 However, a company that publicly discloses material
information through its social media websites can only escape Regulation
FD liability if it simultaneously files a Form 8-K.54 The adoption of this
filing requirement demonstrates how the expansion of technology has led to
an increase in disclosure requirements. The adoption of this filing
requirement also demonstrates why it is not always wise to increase
disclosure requirements as technology expands. Regulation FD forces
companies to act “inconsistent with the manner in which companies and
individuals use social media” because it requires them to simultaneously file
a Form 8-K every time they update their Facebook status or Tweet.55
It is difficult to rationalize increasing reporting requirements when
there is an alternative—market forces—that organically leads to the same
result: an increase in the amount of thorough and timely information
available to investors.

C. Issues Associated with Sharing Proprietary Information with
Competitors
Disclosure requirements should be considerate of the competitive
concerns associated with sharing proprietary information because “the very
information that will enable investors to value the corporation is
information that can and will be used by competitors and others to decrease
the value of the issuer.”56 The SEC has admitted as much when it revised
Form 8-K and stated: “Companies may experience some competitive or
other strategic costs caused by the requirement to disclose more categories
of information more quickly than they otherwise may have chosen to
disclose.”57
Courts already permit the publication of material information to be
delayed for a valuable corporate purpose; in some cases, the corporate
purpose being advanced is keeping information from competitors.58
Sometimes courts also take into consideration the effect their decisions will
have on competition in the markets. For example, in Asher v. Baxter
International, Inc., investors of Baxter International claimed that their
shares fell $11 per share as a result of materially misleading projections in
November 2001.59 Baxter shares fell after it released its second-quarter
53

See id. at 243.
See id.
55
Id.
56
Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 763, 848 (1995).
57
SEC Release No. 8400, supra note 31.
58
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968).
59
See Asher v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 728 (7th Cir. 2004).
54
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financial results on July 2002 with sales and profits that did not match
analysts’ expectations.60 The court stated that what the investors wanted was
“a full disclosure of the assumptions and calculations behind the
projections,” but held that this would not be a sensible requirement because
“[m]any of the assumptions and calculations would be more useful to a
firm’s rivals than to its investors.”61 A rival can use that information to
decrease the value of the firm—“[i]nvestors can have the information, but at
a price: their investment will be worth less.”62
Some may argue that increasing the requirements for all will
balance out any competitive advantage gained by any. However, this
argument fails to consider the potential loss of innovation. “[I]n an economy
with greater inherent first-mover advantage,” innovation and risk-taking
occurs more frequently.63 Therefore, when competitive advantage is
decreased, firms may be less incentivized to spend time inventing new
products and processes because they will not receive the economic benefit
that competitive advantage creates. Firms may even choose to abandon
profitable projects completely if disclosures are increased because rivals’
responses could make the project far less attractive.64 Therefore, increasing
disclosures could decrease the amount of new products and processes being
introduced to the market. It could also drastically increase the amount of
time it takes for new products and processes to be created because firms
will not invent new processes and products until the costs—which are
greater when competitive advantage decreases—outweigh the benefits—
which are lesser when competitive advantage decreases.
It is also important to keep in mind that increased disclosure
requirements do not just impact domestic issuers vis-à-vis each other, but
also impact domestic issuers vis-à-vis foreign issuers. Expanded disclosure
requirements can decrease the marketability of U.S. capital markets for
foreign issuers and put domestic issuers at a disadvantage because firms that
are subject to the U.S. securities laws are forced “to share useful
commercial information with all of their competitors,” while many of their
foreign competitors are not subject to the same requirements.65

60

See id.
Id. at 733.
62
Kitch, supra note 56, at 848.
63
Id. at 856.
64
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 708.
65
Kitch, supra note 56, at 857.
61
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D. Liability Concerns
The securities laws “impose significant liability for the production
of misinformation.”66 They make an issuer liable in both private actions and
SEC enforcement actions. In SEC enforcement actions, the SEC can seek
civil penalties as well as injunctive relief.67 Section 12(a)(1) of the
Securities Act gives any purchaser a rescission remedy for any violation of
section 5.68 Section 12(a)(2) gives any purchaser a rescission remedy for a
material misstatement or omission in a prospectus while section 11 imposes
extensive damage liability on an issuer when there is a material
misstatement or omission in their registration statement.69 Furthermore, the
SEC can bring enforcement actions for fraud under section 17.70 The
Securities Exchange Act’s Rule 10b-5 imposes both SEC and private
liability for material misrepresentations and omissions made in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
In addition to issuer liability, there are a number of secondary
liability provisions that impose liability upon underwriters, directors,
control persons, and experts, such as lawyers and accountants.71 For
example, section 11 of the Securities Act imposes extensive damage
liability on those associated with a public distribution—absent due
diligence—when there is a material falsity or omission in a registration
statement.72 These actors have come to “expect compensation for the
additional liability risk they are forced to assume as well as the additional
expenses incurred in carrying out their diligence obligations.”73 It has been
calculated that the threat of private civil liability accounts for “a sizable
portion of the underwriters’ spread” in the form of a liability risk
premium.74 This significant regulatory cost is largely borne by investors.75
Lawyers and accountants are also exposed to sanctions if they make
misstatements directly to investors or “willfully aid an issuer that misleads
the investing public.”76 The SEC can seek penalties for aiding and abetting
66

Id. at 770.
See Securities Act of 1933 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (2012); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012).
68
See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1) (2012).
69
See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012); COX ET
AL., supra note 1, at 485.
70
See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 485.
71
See Langevoort, supra note 45, at 51 (issuers do not have the due diligence
defense).
72
See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 485.
73
Id. at 486.
74
Langevoort, supra note 45, at 45–46.
75
See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 486.
76
Langevoort, supra note 45, at 46.
67
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under both section 15(b) of the Securities Act and section 20(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act. Managers are liable in both SEC and private
lawsuits if they make misleading statements or if they are deemed part of a
control group responsible for fraud.77 Both section 15(a) of the Securities
Act and section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act impose liability on
control persons.78 Furthermore, under both section 20(e) of the Securities
Act and section 21(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act, the SEC can
prohibit “culpable executives from further serving as an officer or director
of a publicly traded corporation.”79 It is also important to keep in mind that
a criminal prosecution potentially attends the willful violation of any
provision of the securities laws (Securities Exchange Act section 32(a)).80
These various and expansive liability concerns have become more
worrisome since the adoption of Form S-3 (which permits short-form
registration for large capitalization issuers) and the expanded availability of
shelf registration (which allows for registration without having to issue
securities immediately). “Disclosure quality is threatened by the de facto
loss of opportunity for external due diligence by underwriters and others
associated with the issuance” in these transactions.81 However, even with
the many due diligence challenges these transactions create, the liability
provisions are just as strict and unforgiving as for other, much less time
sensitive, transactions.
If reporting requirements are further expanded, the already
extensive list of liability concerns will increase. This can lead to an
undesirable increase in compensations (to parallel the increased liability
risk), which would impose an even more significant regulatory cost upon
the capital market formation process and ultimately, investors.

E. Doctrinal Issues
There are multiple doctrinal problems with the securities laws that
will be exacerbated if the reporting requirements are expanded, including
the proper articulation of the duty to disclose. This section focuses on how
to articulate the duty of issuers and other participants to update information
77

See id. at 54.
See Securities Act of 1933 § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77o(a) (2012) (stating a
defense when a control person “had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the
controlled person is alleged to exist”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78t)(a) (2012) (stating a defense when a control person “acted in
good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting
the violation or cause of action”).
79
Langevoort, supra note 45, at 54.
80
See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 485.
81
Langevoort, supra note 45, at 46.
78
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and how to articulate their duty to correct information. These issues tie into
a discussion of managers’ duties under the Management Discussion and
Analysis (MD&A) requirement. Another doctrinal issue discussed in this
section pertains to ripeness. When do the duties to update and correct arise?
1. Articulating a Duty
The issues that arise in articulating a duty can be seen when
analyzing the SEC’s duty to update, duty to correct, and MD&A disclosure
requirement embedded in Regulation S-K. The Seventh Circuit attempted to
define the differences between the duty to update and the duty to correct in
Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories.82 In Gallagher, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) sent a warning threatening severe consequences to
Abbott Laboratories for deficiencies in manufacturing quality control in
March 2009.83 By September 1999, the FDA wanted to inflict severe
penalties and change Abbott’s methods of doing business.84 At the end of
September, Abbott issued a press release “asserting that Abbott was in
‘substantial’ compliance with federal regulations.”85 By November 1999, a
court entered a decree requiring Abbott to remove 125 of its products from
the market and pay $100 million in civil fines.86
The plaintiffs—buyers of Abbott’s securities between March and
November 1999—argued that Abbott committed fraud by deferring public
revelation.87 The court held against the plaintiffs, stating that the plaintiffs
never identified any false statement or any statement made misleading by
the omission of news about the FDA’s demand.88 The court stated that
under the periodic disclosure system adopted by the SEC, firms do not
“have an absolute duty to disclose all information material to stock prices as
soon as news comes into their possession.”89 Under their reasoning, “firms
are entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as bad news) unless
positive law creates a duty to disclose”— when a firm is issuing securities
or is required to file annual or other periodic reports.90
The court drew a particularly sharp line between the duty to correct
and the duty to update with an example. The court stated that if Abbott’s

82

Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2001).
See id. at 807.
84
See id.
85
Id. at 807–08.
86
See id. at 808.
87
See id.
88
See id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
83
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10-K report had said that Abbott’s net income for 1998 was $500
million, and the actual income was $400 million, Abbott would have
had to fix the error. But if the 10-K report had projected a net income
of $125 million for the first quarter of 1999, and accountants
determined in May that the actual profit was only $100 million, there
would have been nothing to correct; a projection is not rendered false
when the world turns out otherwise.91

Therefore, according to the Seventh Circuit, in a periodic disclosure system,
a firm is under a duty to correct unless it is issuing securities, when it is
under a duty to update its registration statement and prospectus.92
There are multiple instances in which a company is under a specific
duty to correct. When a reporting company makes a statement it later
determines is misleading, it must correct that statement if the statement is
likely to be material to investors.93 However, it is not always easy to
determine what is material to investors. Furthermore, how does one define
misleading and how misleading does a statement need to be for it to require
correction? These are difficult questions that reporting companies must
answer correctly in order to avoid liability.
A reporting company may also be required to correct erroneous
rumors leaked by the company itself or its agents.94 This duty to correct
raises further questions: how many people does a leak need to reach for a
company to be under the duty to correct it and how erroneous does the
rumor have to be for it to require correction? Furthermore, does an issuer
have a duty to correct erroneous rumors or forecasts issued by third parties?
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc. provides some clarification as to the last
question. The Elkind court held that Liggett & Meyers (L&M) had no duty
to correct overly optimistic projections and forecasts because they were
solely the product of analysts unrelated to L&M.95 However, the court did
suggest that “had L&M so involved itself with the analysts’ published
reports that such reports had the expressed or implied endorsement of the
company, a duty to correct might have been triggered.”96 Since Elkind,
many courts have held issuer’s liable for not correcting erroneous
statements leaked by analysts when they were overly involved in the
reports.97 However, the question remains as to how much involvement an
issuer must have for the issuer to be under a duty to correct.
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Lastly, reporting companies may also be liable for omitted
information if keeping this information private makes the information that is
public materially false.98 Determining when privately kept information
causes public information to be materially false can be a difficult task.
There are just as many questions concerning the duty to update as
there are concerning the duty to correct. However, articulating the duty to
update is made even more difficult by the MD&A section of SEC filings,
which is set forth in Item 303 of Regulation S-K.99 The MD&A section
requires “management to provide narrative explanations of the financial
statements” with the purpose of both increasing transparency and providing
better disclosure to investors.100
Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Communications, Inc. demonstrates
how management may find it difficult to determine what they are required
to include in the MD&A section of their filing.101 In Panther Partners,
Ikanos Communications Inc. made 72% of its 2005 revenues by selling its
VDSL Version Four chips to two of its largest customers—Sumitomo
Electric and NEC.102 In January 2006, Ikanos learned that there were quality
issues with the chips and during the weeks leading up to Ikanos’s March
secondary offering of its securities, Ikanos received an increasing number of
complaints about the chips from Sumitomo Electric and NEC.103
Three months after the secondary offering, Ikanos reached an
agreement with Sumitomo Electric and NEC—it replaced all of the units it
had sold (not just the defective ones) at its own expense.104 Thus, Ikanos
had to report a $2.2 million net loss for the second quarter, causing its stock
to drop over 25%.105 Plaintiffs brought suit as a putative securities class
action, alleging in part that disclosures in Ikanos’s offering statement and
registration statement for the secondary offering were inadequate and in
contravention of Item 303.106 Plaintiffs alleged “that Ikanos did not disclose
the magnitude of the defect issue in either the” registration statement or the
prospectus—it simply cautioned in generalized terms.107
The court stated that the SEC’s interpretative release regarding Item
303 clarifies that the “the Regulation imposes a disclosure duty ‘where a
98
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trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is both [1] presently
known to management and [2] reasonably likely to have material effects on
the registrant's financial condition or results of operations.’”108 The court
held that the plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly alleged this because not only
was Ikanos receiving an increasing number of calls regarding the defect
from key customers, but the Board of Directors was discussing the issue,
Ikanos “was aware of the ‘uncertainty’ that it might have to accept returns
of a substantial volume, if not all, of the chips,” and Ikanos’s
representatives were meeting with Sumitomo Electric and NEC.109
Although Panther Partners seems to be a more clear-cut case than
most, its definition of what must be included in an MD&A is open to
interpretation because it can be difficult for a company to determine the
parameters of reasonably likely and material in certain situations.
2. Ripeness
The second doctrinal issue is determining ripeness: when do the
duties to update and correct arise? Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano
demonstrates the ripeness issues that arise in SEC filings.110 In Matrixx, the
respondents, who were plaintiffs in a securities fraud class action against
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., alleged that petitioners failed to disclose reports of
a possible link between its leading product Zicam Cold Remedy—which
accounted for 70% of Matrixx’s sales—and loss of smell.111
“Respondents allege[d] that Matrixx made a series of public
statements that were misleading in light of the [following] information.”112
In October 2003, shortly after two doctors presented their findings of a
possible link between Zicam and a loss of smell at a meeting of the
American Rhinologic Society (ARS), “Matrixx stated that Zicam was
‘poised for growth in the upcoming cough and cold season’ and that the
company” expected revenues to “be up in excess of 50%.”113 In its
November 2003 Form 10-Q, Matrixx stated that product liability actions
could materially affect Matrixx but it did not disclose that two plaintiffs
who had lost their sense of smell after using Zicam had already sued
Matrixx.114 Furthermore, Matrixx released a press release stating that it
Id. at 120 (citing Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6835,
Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, Investment Company Act Release No.
16,961, 1989 WL 1092885, at *6 (May 18, 1989)).
109
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believed “statements alleging that intranasal Zicam products caused [loss of
smell we]re completely unfounded and misleading.”115 Based on these
allegations, the “respondents claimed that Matrixx violated § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b–5 by making untrue statements
of fact and failing to disclose material facts necessary to make the
statements not misleading.”116
Respondents had to “show that [petitioners] made a statement that
was ‘misleading as to a material fact’” in order to prevail on a section 10(b)
claim.117 The Court applied the TSC Industries standard of materiality—in
order to meet the materiality requirement there must be “a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available.”118 To meet this standard, something more is
needed than mere reports of adverse events.119 The Court stated that this
something more does not have to be statistically significant data.120 It “can
come from ‘the source, content, and context of the reports.’”121
When the Court applied the “total mix” standard to Matrixx, it
concluded that respondents adequately pleaded materiality.122 Matrixx not
only received reports from medical professionals about patients losing their
sense of smell after using Zicam,123 but “two plaintiffs had already sued
Matrixx for allegedly causing them to lose their sense of smell,”124 Matrixx
was aware of the ARS presentation, and medical researchers had drawn
Matrixx’s attention to studies demonstrating a link between intranasal use of
zinc and loss of smell.125 The Court concluded that it was “substantially
likely that a reasonable investor would have viewed this information ‘as
having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made
available.’”126
In Matrixx the Court applied the TSC Industries standard of
materiality in the section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 context. The Supreme Court
applies this standard in “[v]irtually all cases involving materiality
115
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determinations under the federal securities laws.”127 However, this standard
leaves many questions unanswered: how does one define a substantial
likelihood? How does one define the reasonable investor? And finally, what
does it mean to significantly alter the total mix of information made
available? Reporting companies are under extreme pressure to answer these
questions correctly because of the potential for liability.
The TSC Industries materiality standard only applies to historical
facts—it does not apply in cases where the materiality of a misstatement or
omission concerning a merger is being analyzed, because these types of
cases concern a fact uncertain of occurrence or, in other words, a
speculative fact. Basic Inc. v. Levinson articulated the materiality standard
for speculative facts. In Basic—which concerned a merger between Basic
Inc. and Combustion Engineering, Inc.—the Supreme Court held that the
materiality of a speculative fact depends on the
“probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of
the event in light of the totality of the company activity.” . . . [I]n order
to assess the probability that the event will occur, a factfinder will
need to look to indicia of interest in the transaction at the highest
corporate levels. . . . To assess the magnitude of the transaction . . . , a
factfinder will need to consider such facts as the size of the two
corporate entities and of the potential premiums over market value.”128

What level of interest in the transaction at the highest corporate
levels must be met to meet this standard? Furthermore, how is “highest
corporate levels” defined? How large do the two corporate entities have to
be to meet this standard and how large do the potential premiums over
market value have to be? These questions demonstrate that the TSC
Industries standard is not the only materiality standard that leaves many
questions unanswered.
The materiality defenses—truth on the market, puffery, statement of
opinion, and forward-looking statements—create an extra wrinkle in any
ripeness analysis. These defenses permit a court to dismiss a materiality
claim at pre-trial, thus saving a corporation from having to spend the time,
money, and energy on a full fledge trial before a jury. The truth on the
market defense applies if there is enough information in the market for
investors to deduce the statement is misleading.129 What information must
be in the market such that the truth on the market defense should apply? The
parameters of this question are still ill-defined.
127
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The second defense—puffery—applies to “ambiguous,
promotional, or hyperbolic speech commonly known as ‘sales talk.’”130 In
2008 an investor survey was conducted in which 33-84% of reasonable
investors surveyed deemed statements material that had been held by a
court to be puffery.131 Clearly, defining when and under what circumstances
reasonable investors will expect puffery is not as clear-cut and well-defined
as courts seem to think it is.
Related to the puffery defense, is the defense that a statement is not
material because it is a statement of opinion. In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, the court concluded that a statement of opinion can “fall within
the standard strictures of the antifraud provisions.”132 However, it never
addressed whether statements of opinion can relate to material facts.133 This
question was answered in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council
Construction Industry Pension Fund.134 In Omnicare, the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff
investor must identify particular (and material) facts going to the basis
for the issuer’s opinion—facts about the inquiry the issuer did or did
not conduct or the knowledge it did or did not have—whose omission
makes the opinion statement at issue misleading to a reasonable person
reading the statement fairly and in context.135

Under this approach, opinions can be material and cases concerning
them should be analyzed as omission cases. Therefore, when confronted
with the statement of opinion defense, the same issues and questions that
arise in omission cases will arise in these types of cases.
As to the forward-looking statements defense, a statutory safe
harbor in the Securities Exchange Act section 21E coexists with the
bespeaks caution doctrine. The statutory safe harbor applies if the forwardlooking statement is immaterial, surrounded by meaningful cautionary
language, or the plaintiff fails to prove that the misleading forward-looking
statement was made with actual knowledge.136 The bespeaks caution
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doctrine, which deems a forward-looking statement not material if it is
surrounded with meaningful cautionary language,137 applies to statements
made in connection with transactions which the statutory safe harbor does
not cover.138 It can be difficult for a corporation to determine what causes
cautionary language to be deemed meaningful.
Clearly there are just as many doctrinal issues associated with
determining when the duty to disclose arises as there are when articulating
the duty to disclose itself. All of these existing doctrinal issues will only be
exacerbated if the reporting requirements are expanded.

CONCLUSION
Advancements in information technology have created a world
where large amounts of data can be rapidly collected, analyzed, and
presented at lower costs and in less time than in the not too distant past.
Therefore, while the reason for requiring reporting in ninety-day increments
was understandable in a paper-based reporting system, that justification is
no longer reasonable. However, technological prowess should not be the
only consideration when determining the optimal points in time for
companies to disclose their performance to markets. This paper set forth
five arguments that oppose the expansion of, and even support the reduction
of, reporting requirements: expanded requirements are associated with high
compliance costs; market forces already induce higher-quality disclosures;
the more proprietary information a company shares with its competitors, the
more its competitive advantage decreases; and both the liability concerns
and the doctrinal issues already associated with the current reporting
requirements will only be exacerbated with an increase in requirements.
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